Will FIFA listen to Iran’s World Cup concerns or will they fall on deaf ears?
- 7 May 2026
- SLAM
Will FIFA listen to Iran’s World Cup concerns or will they fall on deaf ears? The Power of Boycotts in the World Cup
Introduction
This article, the second in a two-part series, examines the historical use of boycotts and its relevance to the FIFA World Cup 2026. Against a backdrop of growing scrutiny over FIFA’s political neutrality, the question is no longer whether politics will shape the tournament, but how states and stakeholders will respond.
Boycotts have long served as a powerful form of non-violent protest, capable of driving profound political and economic change. Historical examples demonstrate how co-ordinated withdrawal, whether economic, cultural, or sporting, can exert meaningful pressure on states and international institutions. The prospect of boycotts surrounding the FIFA World Cup 2026 are brought into sharp focus by the rising geopolitical tensions particularly between the United States and Iran, bring Such scenarios raise complex legal and practical questions such as; to what extent are boycotts permissible under international law? How far can states, teams, or individuals leverage global sporting events? Does the fact these events are subject to strict regulatory and commercial frameworks change the effectiveness of any boycotts as platforms for political expression? These questions sit at the intersection of sport, diplomacy, and international law, illustrating the evolving role of boycotts and withdrawal in the modern era.
In this article, a number of legal personnel (Yasin Patel, Caitlin Haberlin-Chambers, Ketsia Kayembe, Emanuel King, and Lillia-Mae Ward) examine the evolution of boycotts, assess the likelihood of such action by Iran, and consider how other nations may respond to this increasingly politicised sporting landscape.
Boycotts have long served as a powerful form of non-violent protest, capable of driving profound political and economic change. Historical examples demonstrate how co-ordinated withdrawal, whether economic, cultural, or sporting, can exert meaningful pressure on states and international institutions. The prospect of boycotts surrounding the FIFA World Cup 2026 are brought into sharp focus by the rising geopolitical tensions particularly between the United States and Iran, bring Such scenarios raise complex legal and practical questions such as; to what extent are boycotts permissible under international law? How far can states, teams, or individuals leverage global sporting events? Does the fact these events are subject to strict regulatory and commercial frameworks change the effectiveness of any boycotts as platforms for political expression? These questions sit at the intersection of sport, diplomacy, and international law, illustrating the evolving role of boycotts and withdrawal in the modern era.
In this article, a number of legal personnel (Yasin Patel, Caitlin Haberlin-Chambers, Ketsia Kayembe, Emanuel King, and Lillia-Mae Ward) examine the evolution of boycotts, assess the likelihood of such action by Iran, and consider how other nations may respond to this increasingly politicised sporting landscape.
The History of Boycotts
Sport has long served as more than mere competition but as a powerful tool for political expression and international pressure. Throughout modern history, states and sporting bodies have used boycotts as a means of responding to perceived injustice, signalling disapproval, and attempting to compel institutional change. From ideological rivalries during the Cold War to campaigns against racial discrimination, sporting boycotts have repeatedly demonstrated the capacity of athletes and nations to influence global discourse beyond the field of play. International football tournaments have experienced the power of boycotts, with the World Cup being amongst them.
1950 World Cup
As an example of one of the first boycotts/withdrawals, in the 1950 FIFA World Cup, India withdrew from the tournament. This is often cited as an example of the limited impact of unilateral non-participation. The reasons for this withdrawal have frequently been misunderstood. It has long been suggested that India refused to compete after FIFA prohibited barefoot play, a practice the team had adopted during the 1948 Summer Olympics. However, this explanation is largely apocryphal.
India’s withdrawal was primarily driven by logistical and administrative constraints, including the cost of travel, limited preparation time, and organisational difficulties. The All-India Football Federation (‘AIFF’) pointed to travel costs (despite FIFA agreeing to subsidise a significant portion), insufficient training opportunities, and complications surrounding team selection. There was also a preference to prioritise the Olympic Games over the World Cup. Although FIFA had introduced a rule banning barefoot play following the 1948 Olympics, the Indian captain at the time, Sailen Manna, later confirmed that this was not a decisive factor in the AIFF’s decision. Contemporary accounts further suggest that the federation lacked confidence in the team’s ability to compete at the highest international level.
India’s late withdrawal, just ten days before the start of the tournament, also had practical consequences for the competition’s organisation, leaving their group with fewer teams and highlighting the logistical disruption that can arise even from a single nation’s absence.
This example underscores the importance of distinguishing between politically motivated boycotts and withdrawals driven by practical considerations: a distinction that remains central when assessing the legal and political implications of non-participation in international sporting events.
India’s withdrawal was primarily driven by logistical and administrative constraints, including the cost of travel, limited preparation time, and organisational difficulties. The All-India Football Federation (‘AIFF’) pointed to travel costs (despite FIFA agreeing to subsidise a significant portion), insufficient training opportunities, and complications surrounding team selection. There was also a preference to prioritise the Olympic Games over the World Cup. Although FIFA had introduced a rule banning barefoot play following the 1948 Olympics, the Indian captain at the time, Sailen Manna, later confirmed that this was not a decisive factor in the AIFF’s decision. Contemporary accounts further suggest that the federation lacked confidence in the team’s ability to compete at the highest international level.
India’s late withdrawal, just ten days before the start of the tournament, also had practical consequences for the competition’s organisation, leaving their group with fewer teams and highlighting the logistical disruption that can arise even from a single nation’s absence.
This example underscores the importance of distinguishing between politically motivated boycotts and withdrawals driven by practical considerations: a distinction that remains central when assessing the legal and political implications of non-participation in international sporting events.
1960 World Cup
In contrast, the 1960 World Cup showed the true power of co-ordinated action. The boycott of apartheid-era South Africa stands as one of the most prominent and effective examples of how international sporting boycotts can instigate political and institutional change. In the late 1950s, the National Party (in South Africa), extended its system of racial segregation into sport through strict state-enforced policies prohibiting interracial competition. In response, sporting boycotts emerged as a central mechanism of resistance. By 1960, the Confederation of African Football (‘CAF’) had become the first international sporting organisation to expel South Africa in direct response to its apartheid policies.
The issue came to a head in the lead-up to the 1966 FIFA World Cup, where questions of representation and equality within international football became increasingly politicised. At the time, the allocation of qualification places heavily favoured Europe, which was awarded ten spots, while Africa was required to compete alongside Asia and Oceania for a single place. This arrangement was widely perceived as inequitable and indicative of broader structural inequalities within FIFA. The reality is that this was direct discrimination in all but name.
In protest, African nations, co-ordinated by CAF, collectively withdrew from the 1966 World Cup qualifiers. The boycott was driven both by opposition to South Africa’s continued association with international football and by frustration at the lack of meaningful African representation on the global stage. As a result, the 1966 tournament proceeded without any African participation. FIFA was unwilling to increase participation for nations from Africa and saw it as undue influence from governments in Africa. They did not accept it as being unfair. This was short sighted.
FIFA was asked to face the question of the lack of participation of nations from Africa and their association with South Africa despite the apartheid regime, blatant racism, inequality and the human rights abuses by the white minority government.
The co-ordinated action by CAF proved highly successful. As there was condemnation of FIFA. It placed significant pressure on FIFA and ultimately led to reforms, including the introduction of a guaranteed qualification place for African nations in subsequent World Cups. The 1966 boycott remains one of the clearest examples of an entire continent withdrawing from a major international sporting competition, demonstrating the capacity of collective sporting boycotts to drive structural change within global institutions.
The issue came to a head in the lead-up to the 1966 FIFA World Cup, where questions of representation and equality within international football became increasingly politicised. At the time, the allocation of qualification places heavily favoured Europe, which was awarded ten spots, while Africa was required to compete alongside Asia and Oceania for a single place. This arrangement was widely perceived as inequitable and indicative of broader structural inequalities within FIFA. The reality is that this was direct discrimination in all but name.
In protest, African nations, co-ordinated by CAF, collectively withdrew from the 1966 World Cup qualifiers. The boycott was driven both by opposition to South Africa’s continued association with international football and by frustration at the lack of meaningful African representation on the global stage. As a result, the 1966 tournament proceeded without any African participation. FIFA was unwilling to increase participation for nations from Africa and saw it as undue influence from governments in Africa. They did not accept it as being unfair. This was short sighted.
FIFA was asked to face the question of the lack of participation of nations from Africa and their association with South Africa despite the apartheid regime, blatant racism, inequality and the human rights abuses by the white minority government.
The co-ordinated action by CAF proved highly successful. As there was condemnation of FIFA. It placed significant pressure on FIFA and ultimately led to reforms, including the introduction of a guaranteed qualification place for African nations in subsequent World Cups. The 1966 boycott remains one of the clearest examples of an entire continent withdrawing from a major international sporting competition, demonstrating the capacity of collective sporting boycotts to drive structural change within global institutions.
Iran War
Will Iran boycott?
Recent escalation in hostilities between Iran and the United States has put Iran’s participation in the FIFA World Cup 2026 under intense scrutiny. Despite Iran’s qualification and matches being scheduled, political and security concerns have prompted Iranian officials to consider refusing to play on American soil unless their fixtures are relocated. This development raises the prospect of a conditional boycott, even if Iran ultimately competes in the tournament overall.
Under FIFA’s regulatory framework, such a decision carries significant consequences. Article 6.2 of the FIFA’s 2026 World Cup regulations provides:
“If a match cannot take place or cannot be played in full for reasons other than force majeure, but due to the behaviour of a team or behaviour for which an association or a club is liable, the association or the club will be sanctioned with a minimum fine of CHF 10,000. The match will either be forfeited or replayed.”
A late withdrawal, particularly within 30 days of the tournament, could expose Iran to significantly increased fines, alongside the obligation to repay FIFA funding, including approximately $1.5 million in preparation grants and $10.5 million in participation fees. FIFA also retains discretion to impose further disciplinary measures.
Notwithstanding these potential sanctions, indications from the Iranian Football Federation (‘IFF’) suggest that Iran does not presently intend to boycott the tournament in its entirety, but has expressed opposition to playing fixtures within the US. IFF President, Mehdi Taj, confirmed that Iran have plans to “boycott the United States” but “not the World Cup” signalling a conditional or partial boycott based on security concerns.
The central legal issue is whether adequate assurances of safety can be provided to participating teams and supporters. On 12 March 2026, Trump, in a social media post, said “The Iran national soccer team is welcome to the World Cup, but I really don’t believe it is appropriate that they be there, for their own life and safety.” Subsequently, on 16 March 2026, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, stated: “When warnings are issued at the highest level about the environment being unsafe for Iranian football players, this indicates that the host country apparently lacks the capacity and ability to provide security for such an important sporting event.”
In addition, there is the question of whether IFF officials would be permitted in the US. As recently as the 3 May, the USA did not permit IFF officials into the USA.
The IFF has recently engaged in discussions with FIFA regarding the potential relocation of its fixtures to Mexico. However, in a meeting with Iranian officials on 1 April 2026, Infantino said that “the matches will be played where they are supposed to be, according to the draw”. From a regulatory perspective, this raises questions as to FIFA’s duty of care and its obligation to ensure a safe hosting framework for all participants.
While FIFA’s regulatory framework would permit sanctions in the event of withdrawal, the fairness of such an outcome is open to challenge where participation is affected by genuine security risks. Although participation obligations are strictly enforced to preserve sporting integrity and contractual certainty, the responsibility for ensuring safety primarily rests with the host state. If adequate guarantees cannot be provided, Iran’s non-participation may be characterised not as voluntary, but as necessary. In such circumstances, the imposition of sanctions risks placing a disproportionate burden on the team, effectively penalising it for risks beyond its control.
Accordingly, while a full boycott remains uncertain, the likelihood of conditional or partial non-participation increases in proportion to unresolved security concerns. This situation highlights a fundamental tension within international sport between strict regulatory enforcement and the practical obligation to safeguard participants in an increasingly volatile geopolitical context.
Under FIFA’s regulatory framework, such a decision carries significant consequences. Article 6.2 of the FIFA’s 2026 World Cup regulations provides:
“If a match cannot take place or cannot be played in full for reasons other than force majeure, but due to the behaviour of a team or behaviour for which an association or a club is liable, the association or the club will be sanctioned with a minimum fine of CHF 10,000. The match will either be forfeited or replayed.”
A late withdrawal, particularly within 30 days of the tournament, could expose Iran to significantly increased fines, alongside the obligation to repay FIFA funding, including approximately $1.5 million in preparation grants and $10.5 million in participation fees. FIFA also retains discretion to impose further disciplinary measures.
Notwithstanding these potential sanctions, indications from the Iranian Football Federation (‘IFF’) suggest that Iran does not presently intend to boycott the tournament in its entirety, but has expressed opposition to playing fixtures within the US. IFF President, Mehdi Taj, confirmed that Iran have plans to “boycott the United States” but “not the World Cup” signalling a conditional or partial boycott based on security concerns.
The central legal issue is whether adequate assurances of safety can be provided to participating teams and supporters. On 12 March 2026, Trump, in a social media post, said “The Iran national soccer team is welcome to the World Cup, but I really don’t believe it is appropriate that they be there, for their own life and safety.” Subsequently, on 16 March 2026, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, stated: “When warnings are issued at the highest level about the environment being unsafe for Iranian football players, this indicates that the host country apparently lacks the capacity and ability to provide security for such an important sporting event.”
In addition, there is the question of whether IFF officials would be permitted in the US. As recently as the 3 May, the USA did not permit IFF officials into the USA.
The IFF has recently engaged in discussions with FIFA regarding the potential relocation of its fixtures to Mexico. However, in a meeting with Iranian officials on 1 April 2026, Infantino said that “the matches will be played where they are supposed to be, according to the draw”. From a regulatory perspective, this raises questions as to FIFA’s duty of care and its obligation to ensure a safe hosting framework for all participants.
While FIFA’s regulatory framework would permit sanctions in the event of withdrawal, the fairness of such an outcome is open to challenge where participation is affected by genuine security risks. Although participation obligations are strictly enforced to preserve sporting integrity and contractual certainty, the responsibility for ensuring safety primarily rests with the host state. If adequate guarantees cannot be provided, Iran’s non-participation may be characterised not as voluntary, but as necessary. In such circumstances, the imposition of sanctions risks placing a disproportionate burden on the team, effectively penalising it for risks beyond its control.
Accordingly, while a full boycott remains uncertain, the likelihood of conditional or partial non-participation increases in proportion to unresolved security concerns. This situation highlights a fundamental tension within international sport between strict regulatory enforcement and the practical obligation to safeguard participants in an increasingly volatile geopolitical context.
Will other countries boycott?
At present, Iran remains the only credible candidate for a partial, conditional boycott. Other states might theoretically consider such action if they hold strong political opposition to the host nations or their allies, but a full boycott is highly unlikely. In fact, it is being suggested that if Iran were to withdraw then FIFA would look at replacing them with one of the nations that narrowly missed out on qualification. Crucially, effective boycotts require collective action. While coordinated withdrawals, such as the 1966 African boycott, have driven change, isolated actions like India’s absence in 1950 have had little impact. In today’s highly commercialised and interconnected game, achieving such unity is far more difficult.
One reason for this lies in the structure of global football governance. National federations, as members of FIFA, are expected to operate independently of direct governmental control. This limits their ability to impose political decisions on sporting participation without consequences. Continental bodies, such as UEFA have also historically prioritised participation and competitive integrity over political disputes, even during periods of heightened international turmoil.
In the modern game, the costs of boycotting far outweigh the potential gains. The tournament offers unparalleled global visibility, not only for nations but for players, sponsors, and domestic leagues. For many countries – particularly those qualifying for the first time like Cape Verde and Curaçao – the opportunity to compete on such a stage is too significant to forgo. Participation in the World Cup also provides substantial economic incentives. Broadcasting revenues, sponsorship deals, and tourism contribute to both national economies and football federations. A boycott would mean forfeiting these benefits, as well as risking financial penalties imposed by FIFA.
Additionally, the modern game is heavily influenced by players and fans. Footballers, whose careers are defined, or have potential to exponentially progress, from World Cup exposure are unlikely to support political decisions that deny them this opportunity. Similarly, domestic pressure from supporters and commercial stakeholders acts as a strong deterrent against withdrawal. Even in cases where governments have attempted to intervene – such as Nigeria’s proposed withdrawal from the 2010 World Cup – FIFA’s threat of sanctions has proven effective in reversing such decisions. This reinforces the awareness that, in modern football, the costs of boycotting far outweigh the potential gains.
One reason for this lies in the structure of global football governance. National federations, as members of FIFA, are expected to operate independently of direct governmental control. This limits their ability to impose political decisions on sporting participation without consequences. Continental bodies, such as UEFA have also historically prioritised participation and competitive integrity over political disputes, even during periods of heightened international turmoil.
In the modern game, the costs of boycotting far outweigh the potential gains. The tournament offers unparalleled global visibility, not only for nations but for players, sponsors, and domestic leagues. For many countries – particularly those qualifying for the first time like Cape Verde and Curaçao – the opportunity to compete on such a stage is too significant to forgo. Participation in the World Cup also provides substantial economic incentives. Broadcasting revenues, sponsorship deals, and tourism contribute to both national economies and football federations. A boycott would mean forfeiting these benefits, as well as risking financial penalties imposed by FIFA.
Additionally, the modern game is heavily influenced by players and fans. Footballers, whose careers are defined, or have potential to exponentially progress, from World Cup exposure are unlikely to support political decisions that deny them this opportunity. Similarly, domestic pressure from supporters and commercial stakeholders acts as a strong deterrent against withdrawal. Even in cases where governments have attempted to intervene – such as Nigeria’s proposed withdrawal from the 2010 World Cup – FIFA’s threat of sanctions has proven effective in reversing such decisions. This reinforces the awareness that, in modern football, the costs of boycotting far outweigh the potential gains.
What will happen if there are no boycotts?
Even in the absence of a formal boycott, heightened tensions between Iran and the United States raise a distinct but related risk: that players, teams, or officials may seek to use the FIFA World Cup 2026 as a platform for political expression. This creates legal and regulatory challenges for FIFA, particularly in maintaining its stated commitment to political neutrality while preserving order and competitive integrity.
The regulatory position is clear. Law 4.5 of the IFAB Laws of the Game prohibits the display of “political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images” on player equipment or undergarments, with sanctions to be imposed by the competition organiser or FIFA.[1] This is reinforced by Article 15 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code and Code of Conduct, which requires officials to remain politically neutral and prohibits public endorsement of political actors or policies. Taken together, these provisions establish a strict legal framework designed to insulate the game from overt political expression.
FIFA has historically demonstrated a willingness to enforce these rules. In 2017, sanctions were imposed on the Qatari national team after players wore T-shirts displaying the country’s Emir during a period of regional political dispute. Similarly, in 2013, Croatian international Josip Šimunić received a 10-match ban for engaging in politically charged conduct following World Cup qualification. These examples indicate that, where clear breaches occur, disciplinary action is likely to follow.
However, the effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of this framework depend on consistent enforcement. Recent scrutiny of Gianni Infantino, particularly in relation to public statements concerning Donald Trump, has raised questions as to whether FIFA itself consistently adheres to the neutrality it seeks to impose. Any perceived inconsistency risks undermining the authority of its regulatory framework and may embolden participants to test the boundaries of permissible conduct.
In the absence of boycotts, therefore, the principal risk is not non-participation but politicisation from within the tournament itself. Should players or teams engage in political expression on such a global stage, FIFA will be required to make a critical choice: to strictly enforce its regulations, including against high-profile individuals, or to adopt a more flexible approach. The former risks controversy and high-profile disciplinary disputes; the latter risks eroding the credibility and uniform application of its rules.
Accordingly, even without a boycott, the tournament is unlikely to remain insulated from geopolitical tensions. Instead, those tensions are likely to manifest through symbolic acts and regulatory challenges, placing FIFA’s commitment to political neutrality under sustained scrutiny and directly influencing the broader question of whether states such as Iran perceive participation as viable or equitable.
The regulatory position is clear. Law 4.5 of the IFAB Laws of the Game prohibits the display of “political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images” on player equipment or undergarments, with sanctions to be imposed by the competition organiser or FIFA.[1] This is reinforced by Article 15 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code and Code of Conduct, which requires officials to remain politically neutral and prohibits public endorsement of political actors or policies. Taken together, these provisions establish a strict legal framework designed to insulate the game from overt political expression.
FIFA has historically demonstrated a willingness to enforce these rules. In 2017, sanctions were imposed on the Qatari national team after players wore T-shirts displaying the country’s Emir during a period of regional political dispute. Similarly, in 2013, Croatian international Josip Šimunić received a 10-match ban for engaging in politically charged conduct following World Cup qualification. These examples indicate that, where clear breaches occur, disciplinary action is likely to follow.
However, the effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of this framework depend on consistent enforcement. Recent scrutiny of Gianni Infantino, particularly in relation to public statements concerning Donald Trump, has raised questions as to whether FIFA itself consistently adheres to the neutrality it seeks to impose. Any perceived inconsistency risks undermining the authority of its regulatory framework and may embolden participants to test the boundaries of permissible conduct.
In the absence of boycotts, therefore, the principal risk is not non-participation but politicisation from within the tournament itself. Should players or teams engage in political expression on such a global stage, FIFA will be required to make a critical choice: to strictly enforce its regulations, including against high-profile individuals, or to adopt a more flexible approach. The former risks controversy and high-profile disciplinary disputes; the latter risks eroding the credibility and uniform application of its rules.
Accordingly, even without a boycott, the tournament is unlikely to remain insulated from geopolitical tensions. Instead, those tensions are likely to manifest through symbolic acts and regulatory challenges, placing FIFA’s commitment to political neutrality under sustained scrutiny and directly influencing the broader question of whether states such as Iran perceive participation as viable or equitable.
Conclusion
Ultimately, FIFA’s neutrality functions as a guiding principle, but one that is shaped and constrained by practical responsibilities to protect players, officials, and the integrity of the tournament.
The situation surrounding Iran’s participation in the 2026 FIFA World Cup highlights the complex intersection of sport, politics, and international security. While Iran has signalled a potential partial boycott of matches in the US, the broader likelihood of co-ordinated boycotts remains low due to the financial, sporting, and reputational incentives that drive participation in modern football.
Legally, FIFA must balance its commitment to neutrality with its regulatory obligations, including ensuring a “safe World Cup with everybody participating.” Nonetheless, as matters stand, FIFA’s public position continues to emphasise neutrality by treating Iran’s participation as a sporting, not political, issue. In practice, however, the organisation faces a delicate balancing act: it must enforce tournament regulations, preserve the integrity of the competition, and maintain contractual obligations with sponsors and broadcasters, while simultaneously addressing legitimate security concerns raised by participating teams.
The resolution of Iran’s concerns, whether through accommodation, dialogue, or enforcement, will serve as a key indicator of FIFA’s ability to uphold the integrity of the World Cup while responding responsibly to security and political realities.
The situation surrounding Iran’s participation in the 2026 FIFA World Cup highlights the complex intersection of sport, politics, and international security. While Iran has signalled a potential partial boycott of matches in the US, the broader likelihood of co-ordinated boycotts remains low due to the financial, sporting, and reputational incentives that drive participation in modern football.
Legally, FIFA must balance its commitment to neutrality with its regulatory obligations, including ensuring a “safe World Cup with everybody participating.” Nonetheless, as matters stand, FIFA’s public position continues to emphasise neutrality by treating Iran’s participation as a sporting, not political, issue. In practice, however, the organisation faces a delicate balancing act: it must enforce tournament regulations, preserve the integrity of the competition, and maintain contractual obligations with sponsors and broadcasters, while simultaneously addressing legitimate security concerns raised by participating teams.
The resolution of Iran’s concerns, whether through accommodation, dialogue, or enforcement, will serve as a key indicator of FIFA’s ability to uphold the integrity of the World Cup while responding responsibly to security and political realities.